Bonisoli reform, what goes and what doesn't. With a couple of possible ideas and insights

The reform of the Ministry of Cultural Heritage that, after a year of work, is completing its course these days (at the moment it is still in draft form, so the measures discussed below may be subject to change), contains few new features, but they could be enough to radically change the face of the ministry: with what effects it is too early to say, but it is possible to make some assumptions. The basic premise is now clear to all: this is a highly centralized reform, conceived by a pool that did not include a single technician in the sector, and which seems almost aimed at dismantling the 2014 reform by Dario Franceschini (so much so that many have coined the expression “Bonisoli counter-reform” for the current one). The “counter-reform” completely reverses the approach of the 2014 reform, and it certainly should have been expected: the election program of the 5 Star Movement (the party of Minister Alberto Bonisoli), in several of its parts, expressed strong opposition to the measures adopted under the past legislature. They criticized, in particular, the burdening of the central structure of the ministry with the increase of general directorates, the split between the functions of protection and enhancement, and the negative impact of autonomy on small museums. However, the measures that will presumably be introduced with the “counter-reform” are likely to create a kind of hybrid structure between the one envisioned by former minister Franceschini and a ministry with a strong centralist vocation. And it is also likely that smaller museums will still be the ones who will suffer. It will therefore be worthwhile to go into it.

In the draft that we have been able to read (and which, in any case, has undergone modifications in the course of work: we will therefore discuss the points that will most likely be part of the final drafting of the text of the DPCM), the first passage on which to dwell is the extension of the powers of the secretary general, who will become a sort of “shadow minister” equipped with a package of competences that had never before been the prerogative of this figure. The secretary general is, in essence, an administrative figure: his task at the moment is (to summarize) to ensure the coordination and unity of the ministry’s administrative action, to elaborate directives, guidelines and strategies, to coordinate the various offices, to supervise their efficiency and performance, and to coordinate European and international activities (e.g. relations with UNESCO). With the reform, the secretary is also given purely technical powers, such as promoting and coordinating the digitization of the national cultural heritage, coordinating policies on the lending of cultural property abroad, and coordinating policies on institutional communication and information. And we really do not understand why such tasks (think of loans: a measure written in the wake of Leonardo da Vinci’s loans?) should be coordinated at the central level, and moreover by a figure who is not necessarily technical (the current secretary general is in fact not a technician, but an administrative one). Not only that: after the “counter-reform,” the secretary general will also have the power to take over the “tenure of an executive office of general level that is vacant” (translated, it means that in case of need the secretary general could take over pro tempore the direction of the Uffizi or the other nine autonomous museums qualified as offices of general executive level). And again: the secretary general will also have the power to directly confer appointments to the new “district secretaries” (replacing the regional ones: previously, the appointments were conferred by the Director General Budget, upon proposal of the secretary general).

And speaking of the latter, if the counter-reform stemmed from the purpose of streamlining Mibac’s bureaucratic apparatus, perhaps it would have been better if the secretariats had been abolished tout court (not least because they represent little more than an additional burden on the work of the superintendencies): they constitute the local arm of the secretariat general and are basically meant to coordinate the Ministry’s various local offices. The current regional secretariats are, it will be worth remembering, a novelty of the 2014 reform, and were introduced to replace the regional directorates, with the idea of making the work of the coordinating bodies more agile by transferring some technical competencies that were the prerogative of the regional director (acquisition proposals, declaration of public interest, authorization for disposals, verification of the existence of cultural interest) to a collegial body, the regional cultural heritage commissions. One of the good points of the Bonisoli counter-reform is the abolition of the latter: their powers revert to the superintendencies (although on certain aspects, first and foremost the declaration of cultural interest of an asset, the director general fine arts and landscape, another centralist measure, has the final say). However, the district secretariats do not disappear; on the contrary, they come out strengthened since they will also exercise “inspection, verification and control functions at the territorial level, according to the indications provided by the General Secretariat” (it almost seems to be taken for granted that the work of the superintendents must be controlled by the center).

There is, however, another point that would seem to move Mibac more in the direction of an apparatus from a 19th-century Russian novel than on the way to making it a modern structure: the new “Contracts and Concessions” Directorate, which centralizes the competencies in contractual activities, tenders and concessions. In practice, the new directorate will take over the functions of the contracting station for procurement or concession contracts for amounts above a figure to be determined by a subsequent ministerial decree. Now the same functions are carried out independently by museums, regional museum centers, and archival superintendencies. In essence: by the peripheral offices, which with the “counter-reform” will thus lose an important prerogative of their autonomy. A prerogative that will be managed, for the whole of Italy, by a central office (which will hopefully be adequately staffed: on the contrary, the risk is that of further entangling the processes of the dicastery). But this is not the only blow dealt to the autonomy of peripheral bodies: the boards of autonomous museums will be abolished, and consequently budgets will be approved by the central organs of the ministry. Will additional staff therefore be needed? Will museums no longer be able to make autonomous decisions on their budgets? Then, on what assumptions would what will be the remnants of their autonomy be delineated? Moreover, if decisions on budgets will be made centrally, can we expect the timelines to be lengthened since the center will have to work for all autonomous museums?

Some museums, then, will lose their autonomy altogether. On this last point, the outcry against the removal of the Galleria dell’Accademia in Florence from the list of autonomous museums has been of little use so far: in all likelihood, the museum of Michelangelo’s David will lose its autonomy along with the National Etruscan Museum of Villa Giulia and the Appia Antica Archaeological Park (except, however, for the Castle of Miramare in Trieste, which was initially included in the list of museums to be deleted: the grievances of the leghist governor of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Massimiliano Fedriga, prevailed and it was therefore probably decided not to displease the government ally). At the moment, however, the reasons for removing these institutions from the list of autonomous museums appear to be covered by a thick blanket of fog: it is not known on what basis the minister and his team decided to obliterate these museums instead of others. The criteria at the moment are completely unclear and have not been disclosed. Of course, it is clearly not a matter of productivity and accessibility issues, since the Accademia Gallery is the fourth most visited museum in Italy, up from 2017: it is therefore currently impossible to even speculate. And it is also difficult to understand what will become of the current autonomous museums that will lose their independence: they will probably become part of the new "territorial directorates of museum networks." Similarly, one has to wonder what will happen to the current directors: some of them are at the end of their terms (for example, that of Cecile Hollberg, director of the Florence Academy Gallery, is expiring), but there are also those who have just begun their work, such as Simone Quilici, the new director of the Appian Archaeological Park who received his appointment at the end of May and therefore risks losing his post as director of an autonomous museum at the speed of light.

The Accademia Gallery in Florence, which is likely to lose its autonomy under the Bonisoli counter-reform. Ph. Credit Finestre Sull’Arte

While it is a positive point the extension of the functions of valorization to the superintendencies (which thus also return to having the authority to valorize the assets they have in their care), in regard to the latter there are no solutions to overcome some flaws in the Franceschini reform: in particular, the amalgamation of the historical-artistic and architectural superintendencies with the archaeological ones, together with the creation of the regional museum poles, has caused passages of competences and personnel with the result that, in several cases, very vast territories have found themselves with few officials available (passed to other superintendencies or to the regional museum poles). There do not seem to be any measures in the counter-reform to solve this problem, just as there are no measures in favor of small museums (which were the ones most affected by the 2014 reform), or to mend the rifts between superintendencies and museums that came about as a result of the Franceschini reform. Ruptures that constitute more than a mere theoretical formulation: there are practical implications, which emerge, for example, when a new archaeological excavation on an area leads to the discovery of artifacts that need to be deposited somewhere (and superintendencies are often not provided with adequate repositories as museums or archaeological areas could be). And again, regional museum hubs, as mentioned, will be transformed into “territorial directorates of museum networks,” but it is not yet known what extension they will have (presumably interregional), so it seems premature to reason about this.

Finally, the detachment of the export offices from the superintendencies deserves a note: they will in fact become offices of a non-general executive level and will be peripheral articulations of the General Directorate for Archaeology, Fine Arts and Landscape (but will depend on the General Directorate for Archives with regard to decisions on archival assets, and on the General Directorate for Libraries with regard to book assets). This decision (which, moreover, takes us back to the 19th century) is in line with the program of the M5S, which intended to review the organization of the functions of control over the exit abroad of cultural goods. However, no indication has been given as to how these new offices will be staffed, nor who will have to bind the goods if they are denied exit, and it is therefore likely that this new measure, without a clear division of tasks, will end up stiffening processes (as it would be in the case where the export office makes a ruling on the exit of an asset, but the instruction of the process of declaration of interest would continue to be the prerogative of other bodies).

As things stand, therefore, it seems that this reform, beyond a few interesting cues, does not go to solve the problems that currently exist (indeed, more and new ones are likely to arise), nor does it go to effectively and efficiently restore the fabric that the past reform had unglued. On the contrary: superintendencies and museums will continue to operate separately (perhaps it would have been appropriate, for example, to reunite the museums of the former regional museum poles with their superintendencies, since these are museums that are strongly rooted in the territory), while autonomous museums will see their autonomy significantly reduced (which was already not full anyway, as indeed it was normal that it should be, since even large museums are not untied from their contexts and it is only fair that the spillovers of their work should benefit smaller museums as well). A centralist reform, designed mainly by administrative people: perhaps it would not have been bad if the discussion had been broader and if professionals in the field had been able to participate more extensively. Two points in particular need to be questioned: the drastic downsizing of the autonomy of the “big museums” (to the advantage of the central structure, which will in fact make the most important decisions) and the lack of a real solution to mend the rifts between museum and territory.

In the first case, perhaps, after only five years since autonomy became fully operational, and given the excellent results achieved by most museums (and it is not simply a question of more resources available), it would probably have been appropriate to maintain autonomy as it was, perhaps then reviewing the amount of resources that fall on the territory (which at the moment, as we have already pointed out on these pages, appear disproportionate to the actual number of visitors, with the result that small museums are at a disadvantage). It is undeniable that many museums, thanks to autonomy, have experienced increases in visitors and revenue, have initiated modern reinterpretations of their collections, have continued to promote research as they were before the reform, and have forged deep ties with their communities. This new reorganization of the ministry would have been ideal for focusing on small museums: this seems not to have been the case, but the situation certainly can change. Finally, as proposed above, to further simplify the bureaucratic apparatus perhaps it would not have hurt to bring museums and superintendencies together by abolishing museum poles and secretariats and giving superintendencies autonomy prerogatives similar to those of large museums.

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